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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED UT. R. EviD. 404(a) 
IN THIS MATTER AND DID NOT UNDERTAKE THE PROPER 
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY UT. R. EVID. 
404(b) 
In the Brief of Appellee the State attempts to argue that the trial court correctly ruled 
that Coggeshell put his character at issue and allowed the prior conviction to be admitted as 
evidence. Brief of Appellee at p. 23-25. However, the trial court clearly erred by limiting its 
ruling to UT. R. EVID. 404(a) in its determination that the evidence of Coggeshell's prior 
conviction was admissible, when an analysis under Rule 404(b) was also required. The trial 
court erroneously failed to undertake an analysis under Rule 404(b). 
A. The Plain Language of UT. R. EVID. 404 and the Purpose Behind Its Inception 
Evidence that Rule 404(b) Governs the Admissibility of "Other Crimes, 
Wrongs or Acts." 
UT. R. EVID. 404 states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for 
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: (l)Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the 
prosecution. 
. . . 
(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of 
any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
The plain language of Rule 404(a) and 404(b) evidence their differences pertaining 
to the issue of admission of character evidence. Rule 404(a) specifically addresses evidence 
pertaining to "person's character or a trait of character" while Rule 404(b) explicitly stating 
that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person. . ." (Emphasis added). It is important to note that the plain language of Rule 
404(a) does not address evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" as contemplated and 
specifically addressed by Rule 404(b); hence it is presumed, by their plain language and 
inclusion under the same rule, that Rule 404(b) is the appropriate rule to apply to matters 
which pertain to "other crimes, wrongs or acts." It is important to note that Rule 404(b) 
2 
provides no exception for the inadmissibility of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" as it pertains 
to proof of character. Rule 404(b) specifically prohibits such evidence being used as 
character evidence. To say that Rule 404(a) overcomes this, absent any specific language 
to that end, is to create a nonexistent intent unsupported by the plain language of the rules. 
Since the plain language of the rules do not allow such, defendants are not on notice that such 
evidence can be used against them if they so choose to raise their own character in their 
defense. 
An interpretation of Rule 404(a) as the State is proposing, to allow inclusion of "other 
crimes, wrongs or acts" would render the plain language of Rule 404(b) meaningless as it 
pertains to a court's determination as to the inadmissibility of such evidence. Additionally, 
it would undermine the original purpose of Rule 404(a). Rule 404 is patterned after FED. R. 
EVID. 404, promulgated by the Committee on the Judiciary from the United States Senate and 
House of Representatives. At its inception, the Committee noted that character questions 
arise in two different ways, one of which pertains to its susceptibility to being used for the 
purpose of suggesting an inference that the person acted on the occasion in question 
consistently with his or her character. FED. R. EVID. 404, Advisory Committee Notes, 1972 
Proposed Rules. It noted that, "[t]his use of character is often described as 'circumstantial9" 
noting that "[t]his circumstantial use of character evidence raises questions of relevancy as 
well as questions of allowable methods of proof." Id. 
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In the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2006 amendments to FED. R. EVED. 404, the 
Committee acknowledged the purpose behind the relaxation of the rule prohibiting 
circumstantial use of character evidence to include a defendant's ability to raise issues 
pertaining to his or her own character, as follows: 
The circumstantial use of character evidence is generally discouraged because 
it carries serious risks of prejudice, confusion and delay. See Michelson v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 469,476 (1948) ("The overriding policy of excluding 
such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience 
that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and 
undue prejudice."). In criminal cases, the so-called "mercy rule" permits a 
criminal defendant to introduce evidence of pertinent character traits of the 
defendant and the victim. But that is because the accused, whose liberty is at 
stake, may need "a counterweight against the strong investigative and 
prosecutorial resources of the government." C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, 
Evidence: Practice Under the Rules, pp. 264-5 (2d ed. 1999). See also Richard 
Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and 
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U.Pa.L.Rev. 845, 855 (1982) (the rule 
prohibiting circumstantial use of character evidence "was relaxed to allow the 
criminal defendant with so much at stake and so little available in the way of 
conventional proof to have special dispensation to tell the factfinder just what 
sort of person he really is"). 
From the Committee's notes, it is clear that their intent in relaxing the rule to include the 
provision of Rule 404(a) to allow a defendant to raise issues of his or her own character was 
for the defendant's benefit as the "counterweight" to the resources of government. If this is 
the case, clearly Rule 404(b) cannot be superceded by Rule 404(a) since no defendant would 
raise his or her own character under Rule 404(a) if they were thus susceptible to having their 
entire criminal history presented as evidence and used against them. To allow such evidence 
to be admissible under Rule 404(a) would defeat the intent of the Committee by allowing the 
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State the ability to present a tremendous and prejudicial counterweight to the defendant's 
simple evidence of his or her own character. This type of extension of the language in Rule 
404(a) would not be undertaken by the Committee since Rule 404(b) already governs the 
admissibility of such evidence. 
B. The Trial Court Could Not Have Found the Evidence of Coggeshell's Prior 
Conviction Admissible Under this Court's Three-Step Process. 
This Court has previously articulated a three-step process as it pertains to the 
admission of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b), as follows: 
To admit prior bad acts, the trial court must follow a three-step process: First, 
a trial court must determine whether the bad acts evidence is being offered for 
a proper, non-character purpose, such as one of those specifically listed in rule 
404(b). Second, the court must determine whether the prior bad acts evidence 
meets the requirements of rule 402. Third, the trial court must determine 
whether the prior bad acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 403. 
State v. Norcutt. 2006 UT App 269, f21, 139 P.3d 1066, citing State v. Bradley. 2002 UT 
App 348,119,57 P.3d 1139 (quotations and citations omitted). In the instant matter, the trial 
court did not follow the three step process required to determine if the evidence of 
CoggeshelPs prior conviction was admissible. In fact, the trial court failed to undertake an 
analysis of the evidence under Rule 404(b) altogether, instead simply basing its determination 
of admissibility solely on Rule 404(a). Prior convictions or guilty pleas are evidence that 
clearly fall under UT. R. EVID. 404(b) and therefore, should have been applied under 404(b); 
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however, the trial court failed to undertake the proper analysis as is required under Rule 
404(b) in determining if Coggeshell's prior conviction was admissible. 
Even if the trial court had undertaken the analysis, CoggeshelPs prior conviction does 
not meet the three-prong test as set forth in Norcutt. First, the trial court did not determine 
if the conviction was being offered for a non-character purpose. If the trial court had 
considered this factor, it could not have found that the conviction was offered for anything 
other than a character purpose. The State concedes in its brief that it was offered for a 
character purpose when it states that, "[h]aving put in issue his character for violence, the 
prosecution was free to introduce character evidence 'to rebut the same'. . .on cross-
examination with 'relevant specific instances of conduct.'" See, Brief of Appellee at p. 25 
(emphasis added). To properly admit CoggeshelPs prior convictions or guilty pleas required 
a determination by the trial court that it was being offered for a non-character purpose, which 
clearly it was not. 
"Even if other crimes evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, a court 
must also determine whether the evidence is relevant." State v. Allen. 2005 UT11108, P.3d 
7301. UT. R. EVID. 402 states that, "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which 
1
 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 3„ rehearing denied, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 60,163 
LJEd.2d 85, rehearing denied 126 S.Ct. 823, 163 L.Ed.2d 718. 
6 
is not relevant is not admissible." "Even if otherwise relevant under rule of evidence defining 
term, evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible under rule regarding admissibility of relevant 
evidence if evidence is material and relevant to prove only defendant's proclivity to commit 
crime charged." State v. Fedorowicz. 2002 UT 67,52 P.3d 11942. "Where evidence has no 
probative value to a fact at issue, it is irrelevant and is inadmissible." State v. Smedlev. 2003 
UTApp79,67P.3dl005. 
The prosecution failed to show how the evidence of the prior conviction in this matter 
was relevant or had any probative value, particularly since the prosecutor was erroneously 
arguing under Rule 404(a) for rebuttal as to character evidence. Mitchell and Sagg were not 
participants in, nor victims of the prior assault. Although Coggeshell had been convicted of 
a prior assault, the trial court undertook no analysis of how the conviction itself should have 
been admissible or what relevancy it had to the current charges. Even if the trial court had 
undertaken the required three step test in Norcutt it would not have been able to determine 
that evidence of Coggeshell's prior conviction was relevant, even under the provisions of 
Rule 404(a), if they were applicable. 
Finally, the trial court failed to determine whether admission of the prior conviction 
met the requirements of UT. R. EVID. 403, which states that, "[although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
2
 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 859, 537 U.S. 1123,154 
L.Ed.2d 805, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 2005 UT App 405,2005 WL 
2319277, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 132 P.3d 683 
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prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." In Salt Lake City v. 
Struhs,, the Utah Court of Appeals held as follows: 
The trial court must exclude the evidence "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice••" Utah R. Evid. 403. Utah 
courts have long recognized the prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence. 
"We do not doubt that 'evidence of prior convictions and other bad acts has 
tremendous potential to sway the finder of fact unfairly' and increases the 
likelihood of conviction." State v. Florez. 777 P.2d 452, 459 (Utah 1989) 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Holder. 694 P.2d 583,584 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam) (stating "[s]uch evidence of the commission of other crimes must be 
used with extreme caution because of the prejudicial effect it may have on the 
finder of fact"). 
Ibid., 2004 UT App. 489, [^14, 106 P.3d 188. In exercising its discretion to determine 
whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403,".. .trial court must consider multiplicity of 
factors, including strength of evidence as to commission of other wrong, similarities between 
wrong and crime charged, interval of time that has elapsed between crimes, need for 
evidence, efficacy of alternative proof, and degree to which evidence probably will rouse jury 
to overmastering hostility." State v. Fedorowicz. 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194. 
Further, in State v. Decorso. the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[ujnder our prior 
case law, admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial 
judges in the proper exercise of that discretion." Ibid, 1999 UT 57, % 993 P.2d 837. 
"Evidence of prior crimes is generally presumed prejudicial and that 'absent a reason for the 
admission of the evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is 
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excluded.'" State v. James.767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah, 1989), citing State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 
738,741,(Utah,1985). 
In the instant matter, the trial court failed to undertake a determination as to whether 
the probative value of the evidence of Coggeshell's prior conviction was "substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." UT. R. EVID. 403. The Committee on the Judiciary, in promulgating FED. R. 
EVID. 404, acknowledged as follows: 
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It 
tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually 
happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward 
the good man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters 
despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened. 
FED. R. EVID. 404, Advisory Committee Notes, 1972 Proposed Rules. 
Because evidence of prior crimes or convictions is generally presumed to be 
prejudicial, it cannot be admitted unless the proper analysis is undertaken by the trial court. 
The trial court undertook no analysis regarding the evidence and whether it was unfairly 
prejudicial and could mislead the jury into a conviction. The trial court did not scrupulously 
examine the evidence or analyze it to determine whether or not it could be prejudicial 
towards Coggeshell nor did they examine the evidence enough to determine that it should be 
applied under Rule 404(b). Even if the trial court had applied the evidence under 404(b) the 
evidence was still highly prejudicial and could have swayed any of the jurors toward a 
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conviction when without it they may have otherwise decided to acquit. Because the 
evidence was prejudicial it does not meet the criteria under UT. R. EVID.403 and therefore, 
does not meet the third prong under Norcutt. Evidence of prior bad acts, wrongs, crimes 
or convictions is highly prejudicial because it could lead the jury or other fact finder to render 
a determination based upon the past behavior of the accused, and not the evidence that has 
been presented relating to the current charge. For this reason, prior bad acts or convictions 
are considered highly prejudicial, hence the creation and existence of UT. R. EVID. 404(b) 
and the three-step process dictated in Norcutt. 
Although the trial court failed to undertake the appropriate analysis under Rule 404(b), 
the evidence must still undergo the correct analysis to determine if its admission would have 
any prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case. The purpose of the analysis is to determine 
how prejudicial or whether any prejudice exists in the evidence, this is why the analysis was 
developed. Evidence that has not undergone this analysis to determine what prejudicial 
effect the evidence could have should not be admitted. In the case of Orem Citv v. Martineau. 
this Court reversed a judgment of the trial court because the trial court had based its 
conclusion upon an incorrect statue. Ibid., 2006 UT App 136, f7,135 P.3d 884. As the trial 
court in this matter has incorrectly analyzed the issue under UT. R. EVID. 404(a), the 
judgement of the trial court should also be reversed and this matter remanded for a new trial. 
Because the trial court erroneously decided to admit the evidence under Rule 404(a) 
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and failed to undertake the three-step process for determination under Rule 404(b), the trial 
court erroneously found the evidence to be admissible. Evidence of a conviction or guilty 
plea is evidence that would clearly fall under 404(b). Based on the nature of the evidence, 
the trial court should have immediately recognized that Rule 404(b) applied to the situation 
and performed an analysis of the evidence under the correct criteria. Because CoggeshelPs 
prior conviction was not evidence that fell under Rule 404(a) the evidence should not have 
been analyzed and admitted under that rule. By its own plain language, 404(b) deals with 
non-character evidence. Convictions clearly fall under Rule 404(b) as non-character 
evidence. Non-character evidence like the prior conviction in this matter cannot be used 
under 404(a). Further, if the trial court in this matter had applied the evidence of 
CoggeshelPs prior conviction under Rule 404(b) and undertaken the necessary analysis, as 
shown above, it would have determined that the evidence in this matter was inadmissible 
because it was offered for a character purpose when the evidence itself could only be used 
for a non-character purpose. 
n. ALLOWING THE EVIDENCE TO BE ADMITTED WAS 
PREJUDICIAL TO COGGESHELL AND THUS CANNOT BE 
CONSTRUED AS HARMLESS. 
In the Brief of the Appellant the State attempts to get inside the minds of each 
individual juror in determining whether the admission of the prior conviction was prejudicial. 
Brief of Appellant dXip. 29. However, it is impossible for anyone to get inside the minds of 
the jurors and determine how prejudicial the admission of the prior conviction was. 
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"While the jury is, of course, 'the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given particular evidence,' State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 
1993), the jury is also free to accept only a portion of a victim's testimony. Cf Even Odds, 
Inc. v. Nielson. 22 Utah 2d 49,448 P.2d 709, 712 (1968) ("[The trier of fact] is not bound 
to slavishly follow the evidence — given by any particular witness.")- State v. Jacobs, 2006 
UT App 356 f 11,144 P.3d 226. "It is well settled that 'determinations of witness credibility 
are left to the jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's 
testimony. State v. Reed. 2006 UT App 220, f2, citing State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 
(Utah CtApp. 1993). 
A jury is charged with weighing all the evidence presented for a determination as to 
the credibility of the witnesses presented. The jury has the discretion to believe one witness 
over another. Since it is not possible to know what was in the minds of each of the jurors, 
it is not possible to know the extent of prejudice the prior conviction had upon the mind of 
jurors. Given the evidence presented by both sides in this matter, it is possible that the jurors 
could have been unduly swayed towards the decision they rendered based upon the evidence 
being presented as to CoggeshelFs prior conviction. It is not possible to determine how much 
weight the prior conviction was given by the jury. It is possible that the jury may have 
weighed the evidence in favor of Coggeshell until they were erroneously presented with the 
prior conviction. It is impossible to predict after the fact what evidence the jury weighed 
more heavily, particularly given the alternative hypothesis presented by the defense, and it 
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the jury's discretion alone to determine that weight and decide issues of credibility. It was 
severely prejudicial to Coggeshell to allow the evidence of his prior conviction to be 
admitted. 
In Struhs. supra, Struhs presented considerable evidence to counter the City's case, 
including testimony explaining each and every contention of the State. Ibid Given Struh's 
rebuttal evidence, absent the error by the trial court in admitting the prior convictions 
evidence, this Court found that there was indeed "a reasonable likelihood that the outcome 
would have been more favorable to defendant." A/., citing State v. Florez. 777 P.2d 452,459 
(Utah 1989). Based upon this, this Court ultimately concluded that the trial court's admission 
of the prior convictions evidence was not harmless error. 
In the instant matter, Coggeshell presented considerable rebuttal evidence as to each 
and every event the State presented as evidence against him. The matter was one of 
credibility respecting Mitchell and Sagg and Coggeshell. Without being able to go inside the 
jurors minds and see what weight was given to the evidence erroneously admitted respecting 
Coggeshell's prior conviction, it is possible that any of the jurors could have found in favor 
of Coggeshell, absent the error by the trial court in admitting the prior conviction evidence. 
In instances such as this, this Court has previously concluded that admission of the evidence 
could thus not be construed as harmless. Struhs. This Court should similarly conclude as 
such from this matter. 
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In the Brief of the Appellant, the States relies on the case of State v. Housekeeper. 
2002 UT 118,62 P.3d 444, to say that a jury verdict will not be overturned for an improper 
admission if there was not a reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different 
verdict. Brief of Appellant at p. 28. However, Housekeeper is different from the matter at 
hand. In Housekeeper, the admitted evidence was of a prior bad act between Housekeeper 
and the victim, not a prior conviction that had no relevancy to the act or victim. Additionally, 
the trial court in Housekeeper undertook the appropriate analysis as it pertained to the 
admission of the evidence. 
In this matter there is a reasonable likelihood that, had the prior conviction not been 
admitted, the jury could have acquitted Coggeshell. For every instance that was testified to 
by Mitchell and Sagg, Coggeshell provided plausible evidence countering such. Not only 
was Coggeshell's explanation for everything plausible, but Coggeshell, Mitchell, and Sagg 
all testified that alcohol was available and consumed to an intoxicating level during the 
incident. It is possible that the jury may have very well believed Coggeshell's testimony and 
his explanation for the events that happened, and may have placed an undue weight on the 
prejudicial evidence presented as to his prior conviction. Because there are two sides of the 
story, and a plausible explanation existed from Coggeshell as to those events, it was 
prejudicial to allow the admission of the prior conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing and the arguments contained in the Brief 
of Appellant filed in this matter, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's Judgment and grant a new trial. 
DATED this 7th day of February, 2007. 
K. Andrew Fitzgerald 
Attorney for Al Coggeshell 
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